On the Temporal Boundaries of Simple Experiences :: Philosophy Philosophical Papers

On the Temporal Boundaries of Simple Experiences ABSTRACT: I argue that the temporal boundaries of certain experiences — those I call ‘simple experiential events’ (SEEs) — have a different character than the temporal boundaries of the events most frequently associated with experience: neural events. In particular, I argue that the temporal boundaries of SEEs are more sharply defined than those of neural events. Indeed, they are sharper than the boundaries of all physical events at levels of complexity higher than that of elementary particle physics. If correct, it follows that the most common forms of identity theory-functionalism and dualism (according to which neurophysiological (or other complex) events play key roles through identification or correlation) — are mistaken. More positively, the conclusion supports recent approaches that attempt to explain conciousness by appeal to quantum physics. I. Introduction A methodology that I believe has some chance of providing us with a better understanding of the nature of consciousness – or of how it could be that consciousness does not exist, if the eliminativists are right – is one in which we study our conception or picture of consciousness. Specifically, I am referring to our conception or picture of phenomenal consciousness – what one has in mind who, e.g., "gets" the mind-body problem, understands the inverted spectrum or absent qualia examples, or Nagel’s phrase that it is like something to be conscious, and so on. Such individuals, arguably, are thinking about consciousness in a more or less similar way, exploiting a similar conception or picture, similar conceptual structures. Studying such a conception should be, to a reasonable degree at least, just like studying any other conception in cognitive science. And, as with other conceptions, the effort can be a multidisciplinary one, one to which philosophers can contribute. As I said, I think following this route might lead to progress in our understanding of consciousness itself; but even if it does not, characterizing our conception of phenomenal consciousness has importance at least as a piece of psychology. In any event, it is how I am inclined to pursue the study of consciousness these days. This talk describes a small study within that broader project. In another paper (1) I have argued that our conception of phenomenal consciousness commits us to the idea that there are simple components or elements that in some sense make up our complex phenomenal experience. Actually, it commits us to holding that either there are simples or that our complex phenomenal experience is such that – roughly put – analysis will always continue ad infinitum, no matter how a complex phenomenal experience gets carved up. On the Temporal Boundaries of Simple Experiences :: Philosophy Philosophical Papers On the Temporal Boundaries of Simple Experiences ABSTRACT: I argue that the temporal boundaries of certain experiences — those I call ‘simple experiential events’ (SEEs) — have a different character than the temporal boundaries of the events most frequently associated with experience: neural events. In particular, I argue that the temporal boundaries of SEEs are more sharply defined than those of neural events. Indeed, they are sharper than the boundaries of all physical events at levels of complexity higher than that of elementary particle physics. If correct, it follows that the most common forms of identity theory-functionalism and dualism (according to which neurophysiological (or other complex) events play key roles through identification or correlation) — are mistaken. More positively, the conclusion supports recent approaches that attempt to explain conciousness by appeal to quantum physics. I. Introduction A methodology that I believe has some chance of providing us with a better understanding of the nature of consciousness – or of how it could be that consciousness does not exist, if the eliminativists are right – is one in which we study our conception or picture of consciousness. Specifically, I am referring to our conception or picture of phenomenal consciousness – what one has in mind who, e.g., "gets" the mind-body problem, understands the inverted spectrum or absent qualia examples, or Nagel’s phrase that it is like something to be conscious, and so on. Such individuals, arguably, are thinking about consciousness in a more or less similar way, exploiting a similar conception or picture, similar conceptual structures. Studying such a conception should be, to a reasonable degree at least, just like studying any other conception in cognitive science. And, as with other conceptions, the effort can be a multidisciplinary one, one to which philosophers can contribute. As I said, I think following this route might lead to progress in our understanding of consciousness itself; but even if it does not, characterizing our conception of phenomenal consciousness has importance at least as a piece of psychology. In any event, it is how I am inclined to pursue the study of consciousness these days. This talk describes a small study within that broader project. In another paper (1) I have argued that our conception of phenomenal consciousness commits us to the idea that there are simple components or elements that in some sense make up our complex phenomenal experience. Actually, it commits us to holding that either there are simples or that our complex phenomenal experience is such that – roughly put – analysis will always continue ad infinitum, no matter how a complex phenomenal experience gets carved up.